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Abstract
The discussion about how to put together Gentzen’s systems for classical and
intuitionistic logic in a single unified system is back in fashion. Indeed, recently
Prawitz and others have been discussing the so called Ecumenical Systems, where
connectives from these logics can co-exist in peace. In Prawitz’ system, the clas-
sical logician and the intuitionistic logician would share the universal quantifier,
conjunction, negation, and the constant for the absurd, but they would each have
their own existential quantifier, disjunction, and implication, with different mean-
ings. Prawitz’ main idea is that these different meanings are given by a semantical
framework that can be accepted by both parties. In a recent work, Ecumenical se-
quent calculi and a nested system were presented, and some very interesting proof
theoretical properties of the systems were established. In this work we extend
Prawitz’ Ecumenical idea to alethic K-modalities.
1 Introduction
In [21] Dag Prawitz proposed a natural deduction system for what was later called
Ecumenical logic (EL), where classical and intuitionistic logic could coexist in peace.
In this system, the classical logician and the intuitionistic logician would share the
universal quantifier, conjunction, negation, and the constant for the absurd (the neutral
connectives), but they would each have their own existential quantifier, disjunction, and
implication, with different meanings. Prawitz’ main idea is that these different mean-
ings are given by a semantical framework that can be accepted by both parties. While
proof-theoretical aspects were also considered, his work was more focused on inves-
tigating the philosophical significance of the fact that classical logic can be translated
into intuitionistic logic.
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Pursuing the idea of having a better understanding of Ecumenical systems under
the proof-theoretical point of view, in [17] an Ecumenical sequent calculus (LEci) was
proposed. This enabled not only the proof of some important proof theoretical prop-
erties (such as cut-elimination and invertibility of rules), but it also provided a better
understanding of the Ecumenical nature of consequence: it is intrinsically intuitionistic,
being classical only in the presence of classical succedents.
Also in [17] a Kripke style semantics for EL was provided, and it was shown how
worlds in the semantics could be adequately interpreted as nestings in nested sequents.
This also enabled the proposal of an Ecumenical multi-succedent sequent system.
In this work, we propose an extension of EL with the alethic modalities of necessity
and possibility. There are many choices to be made and many relevant questions to be
asked, e.g.: what is the ecumenical interpretation of Ecumenical modalities? Should
we add classical, intuitionistic, or neutral versions for modal connectives? What is
really behind the difference between the classical and intuitionistic notions of truth?
We propose an answer for these questions in the light of Simpson’s meta-logical
interpretation of modalities [24] by embedding the expected semantical behavior of the
modal operator into the Ecumenical first order logic.
We start by highlighting the main proof theoretical aspects of LEci (Section 2).
This is vital for understanding how the embedding mentioned above will mold the
behavior of Ecumenical modalities, since modal connectives are interpreted in first
order logics using quantifiers. In Sections 3 and 4, we justify our choices by following
closely Simpson’s script, with the difference that we prove meta-logical soundness and
completeness using proof theoretical methods only. We then provide an axiomatic and
semantical interpretation of Ecumenical modalities in Sections 5 and 6. This makes
it possible to extend the discussion, in Section 7, to relational systems with the usual
restrictions on the relation in the Kripke model. That Section also brings two very
interesting observations about intuitionistic KT. We end the paper with a discussion
about logical Ecumenism in general.
2 The system LEci
The language L used for Ecumenical systems is described as follows. We will use
a subscript c for the classical meaning and i for the intuitionistic, dropping such sub-
scripts when formulae/connectives can have either meaning.
Classical and intuitionistic n-ary predicate symbols (Pc, Pi, . . .) co-exist in L but
have different meanings. The neutral logical connectives {⊥,¬,∧,∀} are common for
classical and intuitionistic fragments, while {→i,∨i,∃i} and {→c,∨c,∃c} are restricted
to intuitionistic and classical interpretations, respectively.
The sequent system LEciwas presented in [17] as the sequent counterpart of Prawitz
natural deduction system. The rules of LEci are depicted in Fig. 1. Observe that the
rules Rc and Lc describe the intended meaning of a classical predicate Pc from an intu-
itionistic predicate Pi,
LEci has very interesting proof theoretical properties, together with a Kripke seman-
tical interpretation, that allowed the proposal of a variety of ecumenical proof systems,
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Initial and structural rules
A, Γ⇒ A
init
Γ⇒ ⊥
Γ⇒ A
W
Propositional rules
A, B, Γ⇒ C
A ∧ B, Γ⇒ C
∧L
Γ⇒ A Γ⇒ B
Γ⇒ A ∧ B
∧R
A, Γ⇒ C B, Γ⇒ C
A ∨i B, Γ⇒ C
∨iL
Γ⇒ A j
Γ⇒ A1 ∨i A2
∨iR j
A, Γ⇒ ⊥ B, Γ⇒ ⊥
A ∨c B, Γ⇒ ⊥
∨cL
Γ,¬A,¬B⇒ ⊥
Γ⇒ A ∨c B
∨cR
A →i B, Γ⇒ A B, Γ⇒ C
Γ, A →i B⇒ C
→i L
Γ, A ⇒ B
Γ⇒ A →i B
→i R
A →c B, Γ⇒ A B, Γ ⇒ ⊥
A →c B, Γ⇒ ⊥
→c L
Γ, A,¬B⇒ ⊥
Γ⇒ A →c B
→c R
¬A, Γ⇒ A
¬A, Γ⇒ ⊥
¬L
Γ, A⇒ ⊥
Γ⇒ ¬A
¬R
⊥, Γ⇒ A
⊥L
Pi, Γ⇒ ⊥
Pc, Γ⇒ ⊥
Lc
Γ,¬Pi ⇒ ⊥
Γ⇒ Pc
Rc
Quantifiers
A[y/x],∀x.A, Γ⇒ C
∀x.A, Γ⇒ C
∀L
Γ⇒ A[y/x]
Γ⇒ ∀x.A
∀R
A[y/x], Γ⇒ C
∃ix.A, Γ⇒ C
∃iL
Γ⇒ A[y/x]
Γ⇒ ∃ix.A
∃iR
A[y/x], Γ⇒ ⊥
∃cx.A, Γ⇒ ⊥
∃cL
Γ,∀x.¬A⇒ ⊥
Γ⇒ ∃cx.A
∃cR
Figure 1: Ecumenical sequent system LEci. In rules ∀R,∃iL,∃cL, the eigenvariable y
is fresh.
such as a multi-conclusion and a nested sequent systems, as well as several fragments
of such systems [17].
Denoting by ⊢S A the fact that the formula A is a theorem in the proof system S,
the following theorems are easily provable in LEci:
1. ⊢LEci (A→c ⊥) ↔i (A →i ⊥) ↔i (¬A);
2. ⊢LEci (A ∨c B)↔i ¬(¬A ∧ ¬B);
3. ⊢LEci (A→c B)↔i ¬(A ∧ ¬B);
4. ⊢LEci (∃cx.A)↔i ¬(∀x.¬A).
Note that (1) means that the Ecumenical system defined in Fig. 1 does not distinguish
between intuitionistic or classical negations, thus they can be called simply ¬A. We
prefer to keep the negation operator in the language since the calculi presented in this
work make heavy use of it.
Theorems (2) to (4) are of interest since they relate the classical and the neutral
operators: the classical connectives can be defined using negation, conjunction, and
the universal quantifier.
On the other hand,
5. ⊢LEci (A→i B)→i (A →c B) but 0LEci (A→c B)→i (A →i B) in general;
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6. ⊢LEci A ∨c ¬A but 0LEci A ∨i ¬A in general;
7. ⊢LEci (¬¬A)→c A but 0LEci (¬¬A) →i A in general;
8. ⊢LEci (A ∧ (A →i B))→i B but 0LEci (A ∧ (A →c B))→i B in general;
9. ⊢LEci ∀x.A→i ¬∃cx.¬A but 0LEci ¬∃cx.¬A →i ∀x.A in general.
Observe that (4) and (9) reveal the asymmetry between definability of quantifiers: while
the classical existential can be defined from the universal quantification, the other way
around is not true, in general. This is closely related with the fact that, proving ∀x.A
from ¬∃cx.¬A depends on A being a classical formula. We will come back to this in
Section 3.
On its turn, the following result states that logical consequence in LEci is intrinsi-
cally intuitionistic.
Proposition 2.1 ([17]) Γ ⊢ B is provable in LEci iff ⊢LEci
∧
Γ→i B.
To preserve the “classical behaviour”, i.e., to satisfy all the principles of classical
logic e.g. modus ponens and the classical reductio, it is sufficient that the main operator
of the formula be classical (see [16]). Thus, “hybrid” formulas, i.e., formulas that
contain classical and intuitionistic operators may have a classical behaviour. Formally,
Definition A formula B is called externally classical (denoted by Bc) if and only if
B is ⊥, a classical predicate letter, or its root operator is classical (that is: →c,∨c,∃c).
A formula C is classical if it is built from classical atomic predicates using only the
connectives: →c,∨c,∃c,¬,∧,∀, and the unit ⊥.
For externally classical formulas we can now prove the following theorems
10. ⊢LEci (A→c B
c) →i (A →i B
c).
11. ⊢LEci (A ∧ (A →c B
c))→i B
c.
12. ⊢LEci ¬¬B
c →i B
c.
13. ⊢LEci ¬∃cx.¬B
c →i ∀x.B
c.
Moreover, notice that all classical right rules as well as the right rules for the neutral
connectives in LEci are invertible. Since invertible rules can be applied eagerly when
proving a sequent, this entails that classical formulas can be eagerly decomposed. As
a consequence, the Ecumenical entailment, when restricted to classical succedents (an-
tecedents having an unrestricted form), is classical.
Theorem 2.2 ([17]) Let C be a classical formula and Γ be a multiset of Ecumenical
formulas. Then
⊢LEci
∧
Γ→c C iff ⊢LEci
∧
Γ→i C.
This sums up well, proof theoretically, the ecumenism of Prawitz’ original proposal.
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3 Ecumenical modalities
In this section we will propose an ecumenical view for alethic modalities. Since there
are a number of choices to be made, we will construct our proposal step-by-step.
3.1 Normal modal logics
The language of (propositional, normal) modal formulas consists of a denumerable set
P of propositional symbols and a set of propositional connectives enhanced with the
unary modal operators  and ♦ concerning necessity and possibility, respectively [4].
The semantics of modal logics is often determined by means of Kripke models.
Here, we will follow the approach in [24], where a modal logic is characterized by the
respective interpretation of the modal model in the meta-theory (called meta-logical
characterization).
Formally, given a variable x, we recall the standard translation [·]x from modal
formulas into first-order formulas with at most one free variable, x, as follows: if P is
atomic, then [P]x = P(x); [⊥]x = ⊥; for any binary connective⋆, [A⋆B]x = [A]x⋆[B]x;
for the modal connectives
[A]x = ∀y(R(x, y)→ [A]y) [♦A]x = ∃y(R(x, y) ∧ [A]y)
where R(x, y) is a binary predicate.
Opening a parenthesis: such a translation has, as underlying justification, the inter-
pretation of alethic modalities in a Kripke modelM = (W,R,V):
M,w |= A iff for all v such that wRv,M, v |= A.
M,w |= ♦A iff there exists v such that wRv andM, v |= A.
(1)
R(x, y) then represents the accessibility relation R in a Kripke frame. This intuition can
bemade formal based on the one-to-one correspondence between classical/intuitionistic
translations and Kripke modal models [24]. We close this parenthesis by noting that
this justification is only motivational, aiming at introducingmodalities. Models will be
discussed formally in Section 6.
The object-modal logic OL is then characterized in the first-order meta-logic ML
as
⊢OL A iff ⊢ML ∀x.[A]x
Hence, if ML is classical logic (CL), the former definition characterizes the classical
modal logic K [4], while if it is intuitionistic logic (IL), then it characterizes the intu-
itionistic modal logic IK [24].
In this work, we will adopt EL as the meta-theory (given by the system LEci), hence
characterizing what we will defined as the ecumenical modal logic EK.
3.2 An Ecumenical view of modalities
The language of Ecumenical modal formulas consists of a denumerable set P of (Ecu-
menical) propositional symbols and the set of Ecumenical connectives enhanced with
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unary Ecumenical modal operators. Unlike for the classical case, there is not a canoni-
cal definition of constructive or intuitionistic modal logics. Here we will mostly follow
the approach in [24] for justifying our choices for the Ecumenical interpretation for
possibility and necessity.
The ecumenical translation [·]ex from propositional ecumenical formulas into LEci
is defined in the same way as the modal translation [·]x in the last section. For the
case of modal connectives, observe that, due to Proposition 2.1, the interpretation of
ecumenical consequence should be essentially intuitionistic. With this in mind, the
semantical description of A given by (1) should be understood, for an arbitrary v, as:
assuming that wRv, then A is satisfied in v. Or:
A is satisfied in v is a consequence of the fact that wRv.
This implies that the box modality is a neutral connective. The diamond, on the other
hand, has two possible interpretations: classical and intuitionistic, since its leading con-
nective is an existential quantifier. Hence we should have the ecumenical modalities:
, ♦i, ♦c, determined by the translations
[A]ex = ∀y(R(x, y)→i [A]
e
y)
[♦iA]
e
x = ∃iy(R(x, y) ∧ [A]
e
y) [♦cA]
e
x = ∃cy(R(x, y) ∧ [A]
e
y)
Observe that, due to the equivalence (4), we have
14. ♦cA ↔i ¬¬A
On the other hand,  and ♦i are not inter-definable due to (9). Finally, if A
c is externally
classical, then
15. Ac ↔i ¬♦c¬A
c
This means that, when restricted to the classical fragment,  and ♦c are duals. This
reflects well the ecumenical nature of the defined modalities. We will denote by EK the
Ecumenical modal logic meta-logically characterized by LEci via [·]ex.
4 A labeled system for EK
One of the advantages of having an Ecumenical framework is that some well known
classical/intuitionistic systems arise as fragments [17]. In the following, we will seek
for such systems by proposing a labeled sequent system for ecumenical modalities.
The basic idea behind labeled proof systems for modal logic is to internalize ele-
ments of the associated Kripke semantics (namely, the worlds of a Kripke structure and
the accessibility relation between them) into the syntax. Labeled modal formulas are
either labeled formulas of the form x : A or relational atoms of the form xRy, where
x, y range over a set of variables and A is a modal formula. Labeled sequents have the
form Γ ⊢ x : A, where Γ is a multiset containing labeled modal formulas.
Following [24], we will prove the following meta-logical soundness and complete-
ness theorem.
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Theorem 4.1 Let Γ be a multiset of labeled modal formulas and denote [Γ] = {R(x, y) |
xRy ∈ Γ} ∪ {[B]ex | x : B ∈ Γ}. The following are equivalent:
1. Γ ⊢ x : A is provable in labEK.
2. [Γ] ⇒ [A]ex is provable in LEci.
Proof We will consider the following translation between labEK rule applications and
LEci derivations, where the translation for the propositional rules is the trivial one:
xRy, y : A, x : A, Γ ⊢ z : C
xRy, x : A, Γ ⊢ z : C
L {
R(x, y),∀y.(R(x, y)→i [A]
e
y),R(x, y)→i [A]
e
y, [Γ]⇒ R(x, y) R(x, y), [A]
e
y,∀y.(R(x, y)→i [A]
e
y), [Γ]⇒ [C]
e
z
R(x, y),∀y.(R(x, y)→i [A]
e
y), [Γ]⇒ [C]
e
z
(∀L,→i L)
xRy, Γ ⊢ y : A
Γ ⊢ x : A
R {
R(x, y), [Γ]⇒ [A]ey
[Γ] ⇒ ∀y.(R(x, y)→i [A]
e
y)
(∀R,→i R)
xRy, y : A, Γ ⊢ z : C
x : ♦iA, Γ ⊢ z : C
♦iL {
R(x, y), [A]ey, [Γ]⇒ [C]
e
z
∃iy.(R(x, y) ∧ [A]
e
y), [Γ]⇒ [C]
e
z
(∃iL,∧L)
xRy, y : A, Γ ⊢ x : ⊥
x : ♦cA, Γ ⊢ x : ⊥
♦cL {
R(x, y), [A]ey, [Γ]⇒ ⊥
∃cy.(R(x, y) ∧ [A]
e
y), [Γ]⇒ ⊥
(∃cL,∧L)
xRy, Γ ⊢ y : A
xRy, Γ ⊢ x : ♦iA
♦iR {
R(x, y), [Γ]⇒ R(x, y) R(x, y), [Γ]⇒ [A]ey
R(x, y), [Γ]⇒ ∃iy.(R(x, y) ∧ [A]
e
y)
(∃iR,∧R)
x : ¬A, Γ ⊢ x : ⊥
Γ ⊢ x : ♦cA
♦cR {
∀y.¬(R(x, y) ∧ [A]ey), [Γ]⇒ ⊥
[Γ]⇒ ∃cy.(R(x, y) ∧ [A]
e
y)
(∃cR)
(1)⇒ (2) is then easily proved by induction on a proof of Γ ⊢ x : A in labEK.
For proving (2)⇒ (1) observe that
• the rules→i R,∧L,∧R are invertible in LEci and→i L is semi-invertible on the
right (i.e. if its conclusion is valid, so is its right premise);
• ⊢LEci ∀y.¬(R(x, y) ∧ [A]
e
y)↔i ∀y.R(x, y)→i [¬A]
e
y.
Hence, in the translated derivations in LEci provability is maintained from the end-
sequent to the open leaves. This means that choosing a formula [B]ex to work on is
equivalent to performing all the steps of the translation given above. Therefore, any
derivation of [Γ] ⊢ [A]ex in LEci can be transformed into a derivation of the same sequent
where all the steps of the translation are actually performed. This is, in fact, one of the
pillars of the focusingmethod [1, 12]. In order to illustrate this, consider the derivation
π
R(x, y),R(x, y)→i [A]
e
y, [A]
e
x, [Γ]⇒ [C]
e
z
R(x, y), [A]ex, [Γ]⇒ [C]
e
z
(∀L)
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where one decides to work on the formula ∀y.(R(x, y) →i [A]
e
y) = [A]
e
x obtaining a
premise containing the formula R(x, y) →i [A]
e
y, with proof π. Since →i L is semi-
invertible on the right and the left premise is straightforwardly provable, then π can be
substituted by the proof:
R(x, y),R(x, y)→i [A]
e
y, [A]
e
x, [Γ] ⇒ R(x, y)
π′
R(x, y), [A]ey, [A]
e
x, [Γ]⇒ [C]
e
z
R(x, y),R(x, y)→i [A]
e
y, [A]
e
x, [Γ]⇒ [C]
e
z
→i L
Thus, by inductive hypothesis, [xRy, y : A, x : A, Γ ⊢ z : C] is provable in labEK.
Finally, observe that, when restricted to the intuitionistic and neutral operators, labEK
matches exactly Simpson’s sequent system L^ [24]. The analyticity of labEK is pre-
sented in Appendix A.
5 Axiomatization
So far, we havemotivated our discussion on Ecumenicalmodalities based on Simpson’s
approach of meta-logical characterization. But what about the axiomatic characteriza-
tion of EK?
Classical modal logic K is characterized as propositional classical logic, extended
with the necessitation rule (presented in Hilbert style) A/A and the distributivity ax-
iom k : (A → B) → (A → B). Intuitionistic modal logic should then consist
of propositional intuitionistic logic plus necessitation and distributivity. The problem
is that there are many variants of axiom k that induces classically, but not intuitionisti-
cally, equivalent systems. In fact, the following axioms classically follow from k and
the De Morgan laws, but not in an intuitionistic setting
k1 : (A→ B)→ (♦A → ♦B) k2 : ♦(A ∨ B)→ (♦A ∨ ♦B)
k3 : (♦A → B)→ (A→ B) k4 : ♦⊥ → ⊥
The combination of axiom k with axioms k1 to k4 then exactly characterizes intuition-
istic modal logic IK [18, 24].
In the ecumenical setting, there are many more variants from k, depending on the
classical or intuitionistic interpretation of the implication and diamond. It is easy to
see that the intuitionistic versions of the above axioms are provable in EK (see Ap-
pendix B). Hence, by combining this result with cut-elimination (Appendix A), EK is
complete w.r.t. this set of axioms. Observe that, since the intuitionistic operators imply
the classical ones, if we substitute i by c, the resulting clause is either not provable in
EK or it is a consequence of the intuitionistic versions.
Next we will show that EK is also sound w.r.t. this set of axioms. For that, we
propose an Ecumenical birrelational semantics for EK. The proof passes through a
translation from labEK to L^, so we remember that this last labeled system is sound
and complete w.r.t. the birelational semantics of IK [24].
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6 Ecumenical birelational models
In [3], the negative translation was used to relate cut-elimination theorems for classical
and intuitionistic logics. Since part of the argumentation was given semantically, a
notion of Kripke semantics for classical logic was stated, via the respective semantics
for intuitionistic logic and the double negation interpretation (see also [8]). In [16] a
similar definition was given, but under the Ecumenical approach, and it was extended
to the first-order case in [17]. We will propose a birelational Kripke semantics for
Ecumenical modal logic, which is an extension of the proposal in [16] to modalities.
Definition A birelationalKripke model is a quadrupleM = (W,≤,R,V) where (W,R,V)
is a Kripkemodel such thatW is partially orderedwith order≤, the satisfaction function
V : 〈W,≤〉 → 〈2P,⊆〉 is monotone and:
F1. For all worlds w, v, v′, if wRv and v ≤ v′, there is a w′ such that w ≤ w′ and w′Rv′;
F2. For all worlds w′,w, v, if w ≤ w′ and wRv, there is a v′ such that w′Rv′ and v ≤ v′.
An Ecumenical modal Kripke model is a birelational Kripke model such that truth
of an ecumenical formula at a point w is the smallest relation |=E satisfying
M,w |=E Pi iff Pi ∈ V(w);
M,w |=E A ∧ B iff M,w |=E A andM,w |=E B;
M,w |=E A ∨i B iff M,w |=E A orM,w |=E B;
M,w |=E A →i B iff for all v such that w ≤ v,M, v |=E A impliesM, v |=E B;
M,w |=E ¬A iff for all v such that w ≤ v,M, v 6|=E A;
M,w |=E ⊥ never holds;
M,w |=E A iff for all v,w
′ such that w ≤ w′ and w′Rv,M, v |=E A.
M,w |=E ♦iA iff there exists v such that wRv andM, v |=E A.
M,w |=E Pc iff M,w |=E ¬(¬Pi);
M,w |=E A ∨c B iff M,w |=E ¬(¬A ∧ ¬B);
M,w |=E A →c B iff M,w |=E ¬(A ∧ ¬B).
M,w |=E ♦cA iff M,w |=E ¬¬A.
Since, restricted to intuitionistic and neutral connectives, |=E is the usual birelational in-
terpretation |= for IK (and, consequently,L^ [24]), and since the classical connectives
are interpreted via the neutral ones using the double-negation translation, an Ecumeni-
cal modal Kripke model is nothing else than the standard birelational Kripke model for
intuitionistic modal logic IK. Hence, it is not hard to prove soundness and complete-
ness of the semantical interpretation above w.r.t. the sequent system labEK. We start by
defining a translation from labEK to L^. We will abuse the notation and represent the
connectives of IK/L^ using the neutral/intuitionistic correspondents in EK/labEK.
Definition Let [[·]]K be the translation between formulas in EK and IK recursively de-
fined as
[[Pi]]K = Pi [[Pc]]K = ¬(¬(Pi))
[[⊥]]K = ⊥ [[¬A]]K = ¬[[A]]K
[[A ∧ B]]K = [[A]]K ∧ [[B]]K [[A ∨i B]]K = [[A]]K ∨i [[B]]K
[[A →i B]]K = [[A]]K →i [[B]]K [[A ∨c B]]K = ¬(¬[[A]]K ∧ ¬[[B]]K)
[[A →c B]]K = ¬([[A]]K ∧ ¬[[B]]K) [[A]]K = [[A]]K
[[♦iA]]K = ♦i[[A]]K [[♦cA]]K = ¬¬[[A]]K
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The translation [[·]] : labEK → L^ is defined as [[x : A]] = x : [[A]]K and assumed
identical on relational atoms.
Since the translations above preserve the double-negation interpretation of classical
connectives into intuitionistic (modal) logic, it is possible to prove:
Lemma 6.1 ⊢labEK Γ ⊢ x : A iff ⊢labEK [[Γ ⊢ x : A]] iff ⊢L^ [[Γ ⊢ x : A]].
Lemma 6.2 Let A be a formula in EK. Then |=E A iff |= [[A]]K.
Proof First of all, note that an Ecumenical modal Kripke model is totally determined
by the valuation of the (intuitionistic) propositional variables. The proof follows then
by easy structural induction on the formula A. For example, if A = ♦cB then |=E A
iff |=E ¬¬B. By inductive hypothesis, |=E B iff |= [[B]]K. Since ¬ and  are neutral
operators, then |=E ¬¬B and iff |= ¬¬[[B]]K.
Now, observe that every formula in IK is a formula in EK, hence the following theorem
holds.
Theorem 6.3 EK is sound and complete w.r.t. the Ecumenical modal Kripke semantics,
that is, ⊢EK A iff |=E A.
Moreover, EK is sound and complete w.r.t. the axioms k − k4 presented in Section 5.
7 Extensions
Depending on the application, several further modal logics can be defined as extensions
of K by simply restricting the class of frames we consider. Many of the restrictions one
can be interested in are definable as formulas of first-order logic, where the binary
predicate R(x, y) refers to the corresponding accessibility relation. Table 1 summarizes
some of the most common logics, the corresponding frame property, together with the
modal axiom capturing it [22].
In the Ecumenical setting, we adopt the motto that “relational predicates are second
order citizens” suggested in Section 3.2 and interpret the implications in the axioms
intuitionisticaly. We will refer to the ecumenical logic satisfying the axioms F1, . . . , Fn
as EKF1 . . . Fn.
We conjecture that the semantics of a given logic EKF1 . . . Fn can be inferred from
the one for EK of Definition 6: We just consider Ecumenical models whose accessibil-
ity relation satisfies the set of properties {F1, . . . , Fn} in place of generic Ecumenical
models.
Furthermore, following the approaches in [24, 26, 15], we can transform the axioms
in Table 1 into rules. In future work, we would like to investigate how these rules
behave w.r.t the ecumenical setting.
As a first step in this research direction, we finish this section with two very in-
teresting observations about the case of axiom T, illustrating the complexity of the
interaction of modal axioms and ecumenical connective. First of all, recall [24, 25]
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Axiom Condition First-Order Formula
T : A→ A ∧ A → ♦A Reflexivity ∀x.R(x, x)
4 : A → A ∧ ♦♦A → ♦A Transitivity ∀x, y, z.(R(x, y) ∧ R(y, z))→ R(x, z)
5 : A → ♦A ∧ ♦A → ♦A Euclideaness ∀x, y, z.(R(x, y) ∧ R(x, z))→ R(y, z)
B : A → ♦A ∧ ♦A → A Symmetry ∀x, y.R(x, y)→ R(y, x)
Table 1: Axioms and corresponding first-order conditions on R.
that by itself, A →i A does not enforce reflexivity of an intuitionistic model. In fact,
in frames having the reflexivity property, both A→i A and A →i ♦iA are provable.
xRx, x : A ⊢ x : A
init
xRx, x : A ⊢ x : A
L
xRx ⊢ x : A →i A
→i R
xRx, x : A ⊢ x : A
init
xRx, x : A ⊢ x : ♦iA
♦iR
xRx ⊢ x : A →i ♦iA
→i R
xRx ⊢ x : (A→i A) ∧ (A →i ♦iA)
∧R
For the converse, since  and ♦i are not inter-definable, we need to add A →i ♦iA in
order to still be complete w.r.t. reflexive models.
Finally, it is well known that the set intuitionistic propositional operators is “in-
dependent”, i.e., that each operator cannot be defined in terms of the others (Prawitz
proposed a syntactical proof of this result in [20]). It is also known that in the case
of (many) constructive modal logics the modal operators  and ♦ are independent of
each other, as it is the case in EK. But what would be the consequence of adding
¬♦i¬A →i A as an extra axiom to EK? The following derivation shows that the
addition of this new axiom has a disastrous propositional consequence.
xRy, y : A, y : ¬(A ∨i ¬A) ⊢ y : A
init
xRy, y : A, y : ¬(A ∨i ¬A) ⊢ y : ⊥
¬L,∨iR1
xRy, y : ¬(A ∨i ¬A) ⊢ x : ⊥
¬L,∨iR2,¬R
x : ♦i¬(A ∨i ¬A) ⊢ x : ⊥
♦iL
⊢ x : ¬♦i¬(A ∨i ¬A)
¬R
⊢ x : (A ∨i ¬A)
eq
xRx, x : (A ∨i ¬A) ⊢ x : (A ∨i ¬A)
init
xRx, x : (A ∨i ¬A) ⊢ x : (A ∨i ¬A)
L
x : (A ∨i ¬A) ⊢ x : (A ∨i ¬A)
T
⊢ x : (A ∨i ¬A)
cut
where eq represents the proof steps of the substitution of a boxed formula for its dia-
mond version.1
That is, if  and ♦i are inter-definable, then A ∨i ¬A is a theorem and intuitionistic
KT collapses to a classical system!
8 Discussion and conclusion
Some questions naturally arise with respect to Ecumenical systems: what (really) are
Ecumenical systems? What are they good for? Why should anyone be interested in
1We have presented a proof with cut for clarity, remember that labEK has the cut-elimination property
(see Appendix A).
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Ecumenical systems? What is the real motivation behind the definition and develop-
ment of Ecumenical systems? Based on the specific case of the Ecumenical system
that puts classical logic and intuitionist logic coexisting in peace in the same codifica-
tion, we would like to propose three possible motivations for the definition, study and
development of Ecumenical systems.
Philosophical motivation This was the motivation of Prawitz. Inferentialism, and
in particular, logical inferentialism, is the semantical approach according to which the
meaning of the logical constants can be specified by the rules that determine their
correct use. According to Prawitz [21],
“Gentzen’s introduction rules, taken as meaning constitutive of the logical
constants of the language of predicate logic, agree, as is well known, with
how intuitionistic mathematicians use the constants. On the one hand, the
elimination rules stated by Gentzen become all justified when the constants
are so understood because of there being reductions, originally introduced
in the process of normalizing natural deductions, which applied to proofs
terminating with an application of elimination rules give canonical proofs
of the conclusion in question. On the other hand, no canonical proof of
an arbitrarily chosen instance of the law of the excluded middle is known,
nor any reduction that applied to a proof terminating with an application
of the classical form of reductio ad absurdum gives a canonical proof of
the conclusion.”
But what about the use classical mathematicians make of the logical constants? Again,
according to Prawitz,
“What is then to be said about the negative thesis that no coherent mean-
ing can be attached on the classical use of the logical constants? Gentzen’s
introduction rules are of course accepted also in classical reasoning, but
some of them cannot be seen as introduction rules, that is they cannot serve
as explanations of meaning. The classical understanding of disjunction is
not such that A ∨ B may be rightly asserted only if it is possible to prove
either A or B, and hence Gentzen’s introduction rule for disjunction does
not determine the meaning of classical disjunction.”
As an alternative, in a recent paper [14] Murzi presents a different approach to the ex-
tension of inferentialism to classical logic. There are some natural (proof-theoretical)
inferentialist requirements on admissible logical rules, such as harmony and separabil-
ity (although harmonic, Prawitz’ rules for the classical operators do not satisfy separa-
bility). According to Murzi, our usual logical practice does not seem to allow for an
inferentialist account of classical logic (unlike what happens with respect to intuition-
istic logic). Murzi proposes a new set of rules for classical logical operators based on:
absurdity as a punctuation mark, and Higher-level rules [23]. This allows for a “pure”
logical system, where negation is not used in premises.
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Mathematical/computational motivation (This was actually the original motiva-
tion for proposing Ecumenical systems.) The first Ecumenical system (as far as we
know) was defined by Krauss in a technical report of the University of Kassel [9] (the
text was never published in a journal). The paper is divided in two parts: in the first
part, Krauss’ Ecumenical system is defined and some properties proved. In the second
part, some theorems of basic algebraic number theory are revised in the light of this
(Ecumenical) system, where constructive proofs of some “familiar classical proofs” are
given (like the proof of Dirichlet’s Unit Theorem). The same motivation can be found
in the final passages of the paper [7], where Dowek examines what would happen in
the case of axiomatizations of mathematics. Dowek gives a simple example from Set
Theory, and ends the paper with this very interesting remark:
“Which mathematical results have a classical formulation that can be
proved from the axioms of constructive set theory or constructive type
theory and which require a classical formulation of these axioms and a
classical notion of entailment remains to be investigated.”
Logical motivation In a certain sense, the logical motivation naturally combines cer-
tain aspects of the philosophical motivation with certain aspects of the mathematical
motivation. According to Prawitz, one can consider the so-called classical first order
logic as “an attempted codification of a fragment of inferences occurring in [our] ac-
tual deductive practice”. Given that there exist different and even divergent attempts
to codify our (informal) deductive practice, it is more than natural to ask about what
relations are entertained between these codifications. Ecumenical systems may help us
to have a better understanding of the relation between classical logic and intuitionistic
logic. But one could say that, from a logical point of view, there’s nothing new in the
ecumenical proposal: Based on translations, the new classical operators could be easily
introduced by “explicit definitions”. Let us consider the following dialogue between a
classical logician (CL) and an intuitionistic logician (IL), a dialogue that may arise as
a consequence of the translations mentioned above:
• IL: if what you mean by (A∨ B) is ¬(¬A∧ ¬B), then I can accept the validity of
(A ∨ ¬A)!
• CL: but I do not mean ¬(¬A ∧ ¬¬A) by (A ∨ ¬A). One must distinguish the
excluded-middle from the the principle of non-contradiction. When I say that
Goldbach’s conjecture is either true or false, I am not saying that it would be
contradictory to assert that it is not true and that it is not the case that it is not
true!
• IL: but you must realize that, at the end of the day, you just have one logical
operator, the Sheffer stroke (or the Quine’s dagger).
• CL: But this is not at all true! The fact that we can define one operator in terms
of other operators does not imply that we don’t have different operators! We do
have 16 binary propositional operators (functions). It is also true that we can
prove ⊢ (A ∨c B) ↔ ¬(¬A ∧ ¬B) in the ecumenical system, but this doest not
mean that we don’t have three different operators, ¬, ∨c and ∧.
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Maybe we can resume the logical motivation in the following (very simple) sentence:
Ecumenical systems constitute a new and promising instrument to study
the nature of different (maybe divergent!) logics.
Now, what can we say about modal Ecumenical systems? Regarding the philosophi-
cal view, in [17] we have used invertibility results in order to obtain a sequent system
for Prawitz’ Ecumenical logic with a minimal occurrences of negations, moving then
towards a “purer” Ecumenical system. Nevertheless, negation still plays an important
roˆle on interpreting classical connectives. This is transferred to our definition of Ec-
umenical modalities, where the classical possibility is interpreted using negation. We
plan to investigate what would be the meaning of classical possibility without impure
rules. For the mathematical view, our use of intuitionistic/classical/neutral connec-
tives allows for a more chirurgical detection of the parts of a mathematical proof that
are intrinsically intuitionistic, classical or independent. We now bring this discussion
to modalities. Finally, concerning the logical view, it would be interesting to explore
some relations between general results on translations and Ecumenical systems, ex-
panding this discussion to modalities.
To finish, we would like to say a word about our choices. It seems to be a common
view, in the proof theory community, that Simpson’s view is the more reasonable ap-
proach for modalities and intuitionism. From that, the choice of a labeled proof system
for EK seems only natural. But labeled systems have a very unfortunate feature: it
is really tricky to define an interpretation of sequents into the logical language. This
problem often disappears when moving to nested-like systems [5, 19, 25, 11], since
the nestings keep the tree-structure information, matching exactly the history of a back-
wards proof search in an ordinary sequent calculus. Also, having an Ecumenical nested
system would most probably allow for a comparison, in one system, between the nested
sequent for IK [25] and for CK [2, 10]. Hence this is a path worth pursuing, together
with the comparison of labEK with other labelled sequent systems for intuitionistic
modal logics, specially the recent ones proposed in [13] and [6].
References
[1] Andreoli, J.-M., Focussing and proof construction, Annals of Pure and Applied
Logic 107 (2001), pp. 131–163.
[2] Arisaka, R., A. Das and L. Straßburger, On nested sequents for constructive
modal logics, Logical Methods in Computer Science 11 (2015).
[3] Avigad, J., Algebraic proofs of cut elimination, J. Log. Algebr. Program. 49
(2001), pp. 15–30.
[4] Blackburn, P., M. d. Rijke and Y. Venema, “Modal Logic,” Cambridge Tracts in
Theoretical Computer Science, Cambridge University Press, 2001.
[5] Bru¨nnler, K., Deep sequent systems for modal logic, Arch. Math. Log. 48 (2009),
pp. 551–577.
14
[6] Dalmonte, T., C. Grellois and N. Olivetti, Intuitionistic non-normal modal logics:
A general framework, CoRR abs/1901.09812 (2019).
URL http://arxiv.org/abs/1901.09812
[7] Dowek, G., On the definition of the classical connectives and quantifiers, Why is
this a Proof?, Festschrift for Luiz Carlos Pereira 27 (2016), pp. 228–238.
[8] Ilik, D., G. Lee and H. Herbelin, Kripke models for classical logic, Ann. Pure
Appl. Logic 161 (2010), pp. 1367–1378.
[9] Krauss, P., A constructive refinement of classical logic (1992), draft.
[10] Kuznets, R. and L. Straßburger,Maehara-style modal nested calculi, Arch. Math.
Log. 58 (2019), pp. 359–385.
[11] Lellmann, B., Linear nested sequents, 2-sequents and hypersequents, in:
TABLEAUX 2015, LNAI 9323, Springer, 2015 pp. 135–150.
[12] Liang, C. and D. Miller, A focused approach to combining logics, Ann. Pure Appl.
Logic 162 (2011), pp. 679–697.
[13] Marin, S., M. Morales and L. Straßburger, A fully labelled proof system for intu-
itionistic modal logics (2019), working paper or preprint.
URL https://hal.inria.fr/hal-02390454
[14] Murzi, J., Classical harmony and separability, Erkenntnis (2018).
[15] Negri, S., Proof analysis in modal logic, J. Philosophical Logic 34 (2005),
pp. 507–544.
[16] Pereira, L. C. and R. O. Rodriguez, Normalization, soundness and completeness
for the propositional fragment of Prawitz’ ecumenical system, Revista Portuguesa
de Filosofia 73 (2017), pp. 1153–1168.
[17] Pimentel, E., L. C. Pereira and V. de Paiva, An ecumenical notion of entailment
(2020), accepted to Synthese.
URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02226-5
[18] Plotkin, G. D. and C. P. Stirling, A framework for intuitionistic modal logic, in:
J. Y. Halpern, editor, 1st Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About
Knowledge (1986).
[19] Poggiolesi, F., The method of tree-hypersequents for modal propositional logic,
in: Towards Mathematical Philosophy, Trends In Logic 28, Springer, 2009 pp.
31–51.
[20] Prawitz, D., “Natural Deduction, volume 3 of Stockholm Studies in Philosophy,”
Almqvist and Wiksell, 1965.
[21] Prawitz, D., Classical versus intuitionistic logic, Why is this a Proof?, Festschrift
for Luiz Carlos Pereira 27 (2015), pp. 15–32.
15
[22] Sahlqvist, H., Completeness and correspondence in first and second order se-
mantics for modal logic, in: N. H. S. Kanger, editor, Proceedings of the Third
Scandinavian Logic Symposium, 1975, pp. 110–143.
[23] Schroeder-Heister, P., The calculus of higher-level rules, propositional quantifi-
cation, and the foundational approach to proof-theoretic harmony, Studia Logica
102 (2014), pp. 1185–1216.
[24] Simpson, A. K., “The Proof Theory and Semantics of Intuitionistic Modal Logic,”
Ph.D. thesis, College of Science and Engineering, School of Informatics, Univer-
sity of Edinburgh (1994).
[25] Straßburger, L., Cut elimination in nested sequents for intuitionistic modal logics,
in: Proceedings of FOSSACS 2013, 2013, pp. 209–224.
[26] Vigano`, L., “Labelled Non-Classical Logics,” Kluwer Academic Publishers,
2000.
16
A Cut-elimination for labEK
In face of Theorem 4.1 most of the proof theoretical properties of the system labEK can
be inherited from LEci. It is not different for the property of cut-elimination. Hence we
will only illustrate the process here.
The extension of the Ecumenical weight for formulas presented [16] to modalities
is defined bellow.
Definition The Ecumenical weight (ew) of a formula in L is recursively defined as
• ew(Pi) = ew(⊥) = 0;
• ew(A ⋆ B) = ew(A) + ew(B) + 1 if ⋆ ∈ {∧,→i,∨i};
• ew(♥A) = ew(A) + 1 if ♥ ∈ {¬, ♦i,};
• ew(A ◦ B) = ew(A) + ew(B) + 4 if ◦ ∈ {→c,∨c};
• ew(Pc) = 4;
• ew(♦cA) = ew(A) + 4.
Intuitively, the Ecumenical weight measures the amount of extra information needed
(the negations added) in order to define the classical connectives from the intuitionistic
and neutral ones.
Theorem A.1 The rule
Γ ⊢ x : A x : A, Γ ⊢ z : C
Γ ⊢ z : C
cut
is admissible in labEK.
Proof The proof is by the usual Gentzen method. The principal cases either eliminate
the top-most cut or substitute it for cuts over simpler ecumenical formulas, e.g.
π1
x : ¬A, Γ ⊢ x : ⊥
Γ ⊢ x : ♦cA
♦cR
π2
xRy, y : A, Γ ⊢ x : ⊥
x : ♦cA, Γ, ⊢ z : ⊥
♦cL
Γ ⊢ z : ⊥
cut
{
π2
xRy, y : A, Γ ⊢ y : ⊥
xRy, Γ ⊢ y : ¬A
¬R
Γ ⊢ x : ¬A
R
π1
x : ¬A, Γ, ⊢ z : ⊥
Γ ⊢ z : ⊥
cut
Observe that the label of bottom is irrelevant due to the weakening rule W (that we have
suppressed). Hence the Ecumenicalweight on the cut formula passes from ew(♦cx.A) =
ew(A) + 4 to ew(¬A) = ew(A) + 2.
The non-principal cuts can be flipped up as usual, generating cuts with smaller
cut-height.
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B Proofs of axioms k − k4 in labEK
We show next that axioms k − k4 are provable in labEK.
• k : (A→i B)→i (A→i B):
xRy, y : A →i B, x : (A→i B), y : A, x : A ⊢ y : A xRy, x : (A →i B), y : A, x : A, y : B ⊢ y : B
xRy, y : A →i B, x : (A→i B), y : A, x : A ⊢ y : B
→i L
xRy, x : (A →i B), y : A, x : A ⊢ y : B
L
xRy, x : (A →i B), x : A ⊢ y : B
L
x : (A→i B), x : A ⊢ x : B
R
x : (A →i B) ⊢ x : A→i B
→i R
⊢ x : (A→i B)→i (A →i B)
→i R
• k1 : (A→i B)→i (♦iA →i ♦iB)
xRy, y : A →i B, x : (A→i B), y : A ⊢ y : A xRy, x : (A→i B), y : A, y : B ⊢ y : B
xRy, y : A →i B, x : (A→i B), y : A ⊢ y : B
→i L
xRy, x : (A→i B), y : A ⊢ y : B
L
xRy, x : (A→i B), y : A ⊢ x : ♦iB
♦iR
x : (A→i B), x : ♦iA ⊢ x : ♦iB
♦iL
x : (A→i B) ⊢ x : ♦iA →i ♦iB
→i R
⊢ x : (A →i B)→i (♦iA →i ♦iB)
→i R
• k2 : ♦i(A ∨i B)→i (♦iA ∨i ♦iB)
xRy, y : A ⊢ y : A
xRy, y : A ⊢ x : ♦iA
♦iR
xRy, y : A ⊢ x : ♦iA ∨i ♦iB
∨iR1
xRy, y : B ⊢ y : B
xRy, y : B ⊢ x : ♦iB
♦iR
xRy, y : B ⊢ x : ♦iA ∨i ♦iB
∨iR2
xRy, y : A ∨i B ⊢ x : ♦iA ∨i ♦iB
∨iL
x : ♦i(A ∨i B) ⊢ x : ♦iA ∨i ♦iB
♦iL
⊢ x : ♦i(A ∨i B)→i (♦iA ∨i ♦iB)
→i R
• k3 : (♦iA →i B)→i (A →i B)
xRy, x : (♦iA →i B), y : A ⊢ y : A
xRy, x : (♦iA→i B), y : A ⊢ x : ♦iA
♦iR
xRy, y : A, y : B ⊢ y : B
xRy, y : A, x : B ⊢ y : B
L
xRy, x : (♦iA →i B), y : A ⊢ y : B
→i L
xRy, x : (♦iA →i B) ⊢ y : A→i B
→i R
x : (♦iA →i B) ⊢ x : (A→i B)
R
⊢ x : (♦iA→i B)→i (A→i B)
→i R
• k4 : ♦i⊥ →i ⊥
xRy, y : ⊥ ⊢ x : ⊥
⊥
x : ♦i⊥ ⊢ x : ⊥
♦iL
⊢ x : ♦i⊥ →i ⊥
→i R
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Initial and structural rules
x : A, Γ ⊢ x : A
init
Γ ⊢ y : ⊥
Γ ⊢ x : A
W
Propositional rules
x : A, x : B, Γ ⊢ z : C
x : A ∧ B, Γ ⊢ z : C
∧L
Γ ⊢ x : A Γ ⊢ x : B
Γ ⊢ x : A ∧ B
∧R
x : A, Γ ⊢ z : C x : B, Γ ⊢ z : C
x : A ∨i B, Γ ⊢ z : C
∨iL
Γ ⊢ x : A j
Γ ⊢ x : A1 ∨i A2
∨iR j
x : A, Γ ⊢ x : ⊥ x : B, Γ ⊢ x : ⊥
x : A ∨c B, Γ ⊢ x : ⊥
∨cL
Γ, x : ¬A, x : ¬B ⊢ x : ⊥
Γ ⊢ x : A ∨c B
∨cR
x : A→i B, Γ ⊢ x : A x : B, Γ ⊢ z : C
x : A →i B, Γ ⊢ z : C
→i L
x : A, Γ ⊢ x : B
Γ ⊢ x : A →i B
→i R
x : A →c B, Γ ⊢ x : A x : B, Γ ⊢ y : ⊥
x : A →c B, Γ ⊢ x : ⊥
→c L
x : A, x : ¬B, Γ ⊢ x : ⊥
Γ ⊢ x : A →c B
→c R
x : ¬A, Γ ⊢ x : A
x : ¬A, Γ ⊢ x : ⊥
¬L
x : A, Γ ⊢ x : ⊥
Γ ⊢ x : ¬A
¬R
x : ⊥, Γ ⊢ z : C
⊥
Γ, x : Pi ⊢ x : ⊥
Γ, x : Pc ⊢ x : ⊥
Lc
Γ, x : ¬Pi ⊢ x : ⊥
Γ ⊢ x : Pc
Rc
Modal rules
xRy, y : A, x : A, Γ ⊢ z : C
xRy, x : A, Γ ⊢ z : C
L
xRy, Γ ⊢ y : A
Γ ⊢ x : A
R
xRy, y : A, Γ ⊢ z : C
x : ♦iA, Γ ⊢ z : C
♦iL
xRy, Γ ⊢ y : A
xRy, Γ ⊢ x : ♦iA
♦iR
xRy, y : A, Γ ⊢ x : ⊥
x : ♦cA, Γ ⊢ x : ⊥
♦cL
x : ¬A, Γ ⊢ x : ⊥
Γ ⊢ x : ♦cA
♦cR
Figure 2: Ecumenical modal system labEK. In rules R, ♦iL, ♦cL, the eigenvariable y
does not occur free in any formula of the conclusion.
xRx, Γ ⊢ w : C
Γ ⊢ w : C
T
xRz, xRy, yRz, Γ ⊢ w : C
xRy, yRz, Γ ⊢ w : C
4
yRz, xRy, xRz, Γ ⊢ w : C
xRy, xRz, Γ ⊢ w : C
5
yRx, xRy, Γ ⊢ w : C
xRy, Γ ⊢ w : C
B
Figure 3: Labeled sequent rules corresponding to axioms in Table 1.
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